# All App registration owners should have MFA registered

This test checks if all owners of app registrations have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) registered.

Source: https://maester.dev/docs/tests/MT.1063

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<div class="test-byline"><div class="test-byline-avatars"><a class="test-byline-avatar test-byline-avatar--author" href="/contributors/marcel-ngn" title="Marcel N. · Original author"><img src="https://github.com/marcel-ngn.png" alt="Marcel N." width="28" height="28" loading="lazy" decoding="async" /></a></div><div class="test-byline-meta"><span class="test-byline-text">Contributed by <a href="/contributors/marcel-ngn">Marcel N.</a></span><a class="test-byline-link" href="/contributors">All contributors →</a></div></div>

<p class="test-part">Part of <a href="/docs/tests/maester">Maester</a> · Entra ID · Authentication methods · <a href="/docs/tests">All checks</a></p>

```powershell title="Run this check"
Invoke-Maester -TestId MT.1063
```

## Overview

This test checks if all owners of app registrations have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) registered. App registration owners without MFA pose a significant security risk as credential stuffing attacks can lead to privileged access and potential privilege escalation or data loss.

## Why This Matters

App registration owners have powerful permissions that attackers actively target:

- **Credential Stuffing Risk**: Without MFA, compromised passwords from data breaches provide immediate access
- **Privileged App Access**: Owners can modify app permissions, certificates, and redirect URIs
- **Privilege Escalation**: Compromised owners can grant themselves or malicious apps excessive permissions
- **Lateral Movement**: Access to one app registration can be leveraged to compromise other resources

## Attack Scenario

1. **Initial Compromise**: Attacker uses leaked credentials to access owner account (no MFA protection)
2. **App Manipulation**: Attacker modifies app registration to add malicious redirect URIs, certificates or secrets
3. **Broader Access**: Compromised app is used to access sensitive data across the organization or to escalate privileges

#### Remediation action
Register MFA for all app registration owners listed. Use Conditional Access policies to enforce MFA for all application owners.

## Details

<details>
<summary>Every attribute of this check</summary>

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Test ID | MT.1063 |
| Severity | High |
| Suite | Maester |
| Product | Entra ID |
| Feature | Authentication methods |
| Area | Authentication |
| Resource type | User |
| User impact | Low |
| Implementation cost | Low |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials, T1110.004 Credential Stuffing |
| Supports controls | nist-800-53-r5:IA-2(1), nist-800-53-r5:AC-6 |
| PowerShell test | [Test-MtAppRegistrationOwnersWithoutMFA](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/entra/Test.MT.1063.ps1) |
| Services | Graph |
| Long running | Yes |

</details>

## Source

- Test: [`tests/maester/entra/Test.MT.1063.ps1`](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/entra/Test.MT.1063.ps1)
- Documentation: [`tests/maester/entra/Test.MT.1063.md`](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/entra/Test.MT.1063.md)
