# Entra Private Access application segments should avoid broad or risky destinations

Entra Private Access application segments should target specific destinations.

Source: https://maester.dev/docs/tests/MT.1193

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<div class="test-byline"><div class="test-byline-avatars"><a class="test-byline-avatar test-byline-avatar--author" href="/contributors/crmhh" title="Christopher Brumm · Original author"><img src="https://github.com/crmhh.png" alt="Christopher Brumm" width="28" height="28" loading="lazy" decoding="async" /></a></div><div class="test-byline-meta"><span class="test-byline-text">Contributed by <a href="/contributors/crmhh">Christopher Brumm</a></span><a class="test-byline-link" href="/contributors">All contributors →</a></div></div>

<p class="test-part">Part of <a href="/docs/tests/maester">Maester</a> · Entra ID · Global Secure Access · <a href="/docs/tests">All checks</a></p>

```powershell title="Run this check"
Invoke-Maester -TestId MT.1193 -IncludePreview
```

## Overview

Entra Private Access application segments should target specific destinations. Broad or risky destinations break least-privilege and can cause operational problems:

* **`dnsSuffix` that is a bare top-level domain** (for example `com`, `net`, `local`) - a TLD-wide catch-all. A normal scoped suffix such as `contoso.com` is the recommended resolution path and is **not** flagged.
* **Wildcard FQDN** (for example `*.contoso.com`).
* **Single-label FQDN** (for example `fileserver`) - relies on the synthetic Global Secure Access suffix and carries a Kerberos SPN risk.
* **Broad IP ranges** (near-default routes). The portal's broadest selectable mask is `/1`, so segments *broader than* `/16` are flagged - a `/16`, common for 10.x networks, still passes. Global Secure Access is IPv4-only, so IPv6 is not evaluated. Finer least-privilege CIDR checks are left to the overlapping ZTA segment check.

`servicePrincipalName` segments (Kerberos SPNs such as `HTTP/*`) are a legitimate Private Access construct and are not evaluated.

#### Remediation action:

1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Entra admin center](https://entra.microsoft.com) as at least a **Global Secure Access Administrator**.
2. Browse to **Global Secure Access** > **Applications** > **Enterprise applications** and open each flagged application.
3. Replace the broad segment with specific FQDNs / IP ranges, and configure the correct Private DNS suffix instead of relying on a `dnsSuffix` catch-all.

#### Related links

* [Configure per-app access using Global Secure Access applications](https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/global-secure-access/how-to-configure-per-app-access)
* [How to configure Quick Access](https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/global-secure-access/how-to-configure-quick-access)

## Details

<details>
<summary>Every attribute of this check</summary>

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Test ID | MT.1193 |
| Severity | Medium |
| Suite | Maester |
| Product | Entra ID |
| Feature | Global Secure Access |
| Area | Access control |
| Resource type | ServicePrincipal |
| User impact | Low |
| Implementation cost | Medium |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1021 Remote Services, T1046 Network Service Discovery |
| Supports controls | nist-800-53-r5:SC-7, nist-800-53-r5:AC-17 |
| PowerShell test | [Test-MtGsaPrivateAccessAppSegmentHygiene](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/global-secure-access/Test.MT.1193.ps1) |
| Services | Graph |
| Compatible licenses | AAD_PREMIUM |
| Lifecycle | Preview |

</details>

## Source

- Test: [`tests/maester/global-secure-access/Test.MT.1193.ps1`](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/global-secure-access/Test.MT.1193.ps1)
- Documentation: [`tests/maester/global-secure-access/Test.MT.1193.md`](https://github.com/maester365/maester/blob/main/tests/maester/global-secure-access/Test.MT.1193.md)