# Token protection policies are configured

Without the Token Protection Conditional Access policy, threat actors who steal sign-in session tokens can replay them from any device to gain…

Source: https://maester.dev/docs/tests/ZTA.21941

<!-- This file is generated by website/scripts/generate-test-docs.mjs. Do not edit manually. -->

## Overview

Without the Token Protection Conditional Access policy, threat actors who steal sign-in session tokens can replay them from any device to gain unauthorized access to resources. Token theft allows attackers to bypass authentication entirely because the stolen token is already a valid proof of identity. This access vector enables lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration without triggering reauthentication challenges.
 
Token protection in Microsoft Entra ID binds sign-in session tokens to the device where they were originally issued, rendering stolen tokens unusable on attacker-controlled devices. Configuring the Conditional Access Token Protection policy for Windows and Apple platforms ensures that sign-in session tokens for critical services like SharePoint Online and Exchange Online can't be replayed from unauthorized endpoints.

## Remediation

- [Configure token protection in Conditional Access](https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-token-protection?wt.mc_id=zerotrustrecommendations_automation_content_cnl_csasci#create-a-conditional-access-policy).

## Run it

The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:

```powershell
Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUser
Connect-Maester
Invoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltIn
```

Leave out `-SkipBuiltIn` to run Maester's own checks in the same run.

<details>
<summary>About this check</summary>

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Severity | Medium |
| Effort to fix | Medium |
| Impact on users | Low |
| Pillar | Identity |
| Category | Access control |
| Product | [Entra ID](/docs/tests/products/entra) |
| Feature | Conditional Access |
| Area | Authentication |
| ATT&CK | [T1550.004](/docs/tests?mitre=T1550.004) Web Session Cookie, [T1539](/docs/tests?mitre=T1539) Steal Web Session Cookie |
| Licence | P1 |
| Tenant | Workforce, External |

Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester's: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack's `taxonomy.json`.

</details>

<p class="mt-ms-note not-content"><svg class="mt-ms-note__logo" viewBox="0 0 21 21" aria-hidden="true"><rect width="10" height="10" fill="#f25022"/><rect x="11" width="10" height="10" fill="#7fba00"/><rect y="11" width="10" height="10" fill="#00a4ef"/><rect x="11" y="11" width="10" height="10" fill="#ffb900"/></svg><span>A Microsoft check, part of the <a href="/docs/tests/packs/zero-trust-assessment">Zero Trust Assessment</a> pack. Text from ZeroTrustAssessment 3.1.0, © Microsoft, <a href="/docs/tests/packs/zero-trust-assessment#licence">MIT licence</a>.</span></p>
