# Manage the local administrators on Microsoft Entra joined devices
When local administrators on Microsoft Entra joined devices aren't properly managed, threat actors with compromised credentials can execute device…
Source: https://maester.dev/docs/tests/ZTA.21955
## Overview
When local administrators on Microsoft Entra joined devices aren't properly managed, threat actors with compromised credentials can execute device takeover attacks by removing organizational administrators and disabling the device's connection to Microsoft Entra. This lack of control results in complete loss of organizational control, creating orphaned assets that can't be managed or recovered.
## Remediation
- [Manage the local administrators on Microsoft Entra joined devices](https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/devices/assign-local-admin?wt.mc_id=zerotrustrecommendations_automation_content_cnl_csasci#manage-the-microsoft-entra-joined-device-local-administrator-role)
## Run it
The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:
```powershell
Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUser
Connect-Maester
Invoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltIn
```
Leave out `-SkipBuiltIn` to run Maester's own checks in the same run.
About this check
| | |
| --- | --- |
| Severity | Low |
| Effort to fix | Low |
| Impact on users | Low |
| Pillar | Identity |
| Category | Access control |
| Product | [Entra ID](/docs/tests/products/entra) |
| Feature | Device identity |
| Area | Privileged access |
| ATT&CK | [T1531](/docs/tests?mitre=T1531) Account Access Removal, [T1078.004](/docs/tests?mitre=T1078.004) Cloud Accounts |
| Licence | P1 |
| Tenant | Workforce, External |
Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester's: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack's `taxonomy.json`.