User sign-in activity uses token protection

Maester checks this too

CIS.M365.5.2.2.16 (Ensure Token Protection is enforced for session tokens) checks the same setting. Running both reports it twice.

Overview

A threat actor can intercept or extract authentication tokens from memory, local storage on a legitimate device, or by inspecting network traffic. The attacker might replay those tokens to bypass authentication controls on users and devices, get unauthorized access to sensitive data, or run further attacks. Because these tokens are valid and time bound, traditional anomaly detection often fails to flag the activity, which might allow sustained access until the token expires or is revoked.

Token protection, also called token binding, helps prevent token theft by making sure a token is usable only from the intended device. Token protection uses cryptography so that without the client device key, no one can use the token.

Remediation

• Deploy a Conditional Access policy to require token protection

Run it

The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:

Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUser
Connect-Maester
Invoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltIn

Leave out -SkipBuiltIn to run Maester’s own checks in the same run.

About this check

Severity	High
Effort to fix	Low
Impact on users	Low
Pillar	Identity
Category	Access control
Product	Entra ID
Feature	Conditional Access
Area	Authentication
ATT&CK	T1550.001 Application Access Token, T1550.004 Web Session Cookie
Licence	P1
Tenant	Workforce, External

Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester’s: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack’s taxonomy.json.

A Microsoft check, part of the Zero Trust Assessment pack. Text from ZeroTrustAssessment 3.1.0, © Microsoft, MIT licence.