Resource-specific consent is restricted
ZTA.21810 is in Maester 3.0.0-preview and not in the stable 2.3.0 release yet. It will be in the next stable release. To use it now, install the preview:
Install-Module Maester -AllowPrerelease -ForceHow to get the preview, and go backUse the preview in GitHub Actions
Overview
Section titled “Overview”If you let group owners consent to applications in Microsoft Entra ID, you create a lateral escalation path that bad actors can use to persist and steal data without admin credentials. If an attacker compromises a group owner account, they can register or use a malicious application and consent to high-privilege Graph API permissions scoped to the group. Attackers can potentially read all Teams messages, access SharePoint files, or manage group membership. This consent action creates a long-lived application identity with delegated or application permissions. The attacker maintains persistence with OAuth tokens, steals sensitive data from team channels and files, and impersonates users through messaging or email permissions. Without centralized enforcement of app consent policies, security teams lose visibility, and malicious applications spread under the radar, enabling multistage attacks across collaboration platforms.
Remediation
Section titled “Remediation”Set your organization’s Resource-Specific Consent (RSC) configuration to EnabledForPreApprovedAppsOnly and create preapproval policies for each app that requires RSC permissions. Don’t use the default ManagedByMicrosoft state.
Run it
Section titled “Run it”The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:
Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUserConnect-MaesterInvoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltInLeave out -SkipBuiltIn to run Maester’s own checks in the same run.
About this check
| Severity | Medium |
| Effort to fix | Medium |
| Impact on users | Medium |
| Pillar | Identity |
| Category | Access control |
| Product | Entra ID |
| Feature | App consent and permissions |
| Area | Applications and workload identities |
| ATT&CK | T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
| Licence | P1 |
| Tenant | Workforce, External |
Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester’s: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack’s taxonomy.json.
A Microsoft check, part of the Zero Trust Assessment pack. Text from ZeroTrustAssessment 3.1.0, © Microsoft, MIT licence.
About this check
- Severity
- Medium
- Effort to fix
- Medium
- Impact on users
- Medium
- Product
- Entra ID
- Feature
- App consent and permissions
- Area
- Applications and workload identities
- Pack
- Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment