Non-administrative accounts do not have DC-Sync (Directory Replication) permissions
ZTA.41011 is in Maester 3.0.0-preview and not in the stable 2.3.0 release yet. It will be in the next stable release. To use it now, install the preview:
Install-Module Maester -AllowPrerelease -ForceHow to get the preview, and go backUse the preview in GitHub Actions
Overview
Section titled “Overview”Directory replication permissions on the domain naming context — Replicating Directory Changes, Replicating Directory Changes All, and Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set — allow a principal to invoke the directory-replication protocol (DRSUAPI/IDL_DRSGetNCChanges) and pull every credential hash and Kerberos key in the domain. By design these permissions are granted to Domain Controllers, Enterprise Domain Controllers, the Microsoft Entra Connect MSOL_ account, and a small number of Microsoft service principals. When a non-administrative user, group, or service account holds these permissions — typically because of legacy delegation, an over-permissive ACL on the domain root, or an old administrative install — a threat actor who compromises that account can pull the full credential corpus from any machine in the domain, without ever logging on to a domain controller, without writing files, and without producing a Windows Security event by default. Extracted credentials enable credential replay and lateral movement at will, and the krbtgt key enables long-lived authentication forgery and forest-wide compromise. Microsoft Defender for Identity’s “Remove non-admin accounts with DC-Sync permissions” posture assessment lists every non-admin principal that holds these rights so they can be removed.
Remediation
Section titled “Remediation”- Remove non-admin accounts with DC-Sync permissions
- DCSync attack (replication of directory services)
Run it
Section titled “Run it”The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:
Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUserConnect-MaesterInvoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltInLeave out -SkipBuiltIn to run Maester’s own checks in the same run.
About this check
| Severity | High |
| Effort to fix | Low |
| Impact on users | Low |
| Pillar | SecOps |
| Category | Identity threat protection |
| Product | Active Directory |
| Feature | Permissions and delegation |
| Area | Privileged access |
| ATT&CK | T1003.006 DCSync |
| Licence | ATA |
| Tenant | Workforce |
Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester’s: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack’s taxonomy.json.
A Microsoft check, part of the Zero Trust Assessment pack. Text from ZeroTrustAssessment 3.1.0, © Microsoft, MIT licence.
About this check
- Severity
- High
- Effort to fix
- Low
- Impact on users
- Low
- Product
- Active Directory
- Feature
- Permissions and delegation
- Area
- Privileged access
- Pack
- Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment