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Enterprise applications must require explicit assignment or scoped provisioning

ZTA.21869MediumEntra IDApplicationsPreview 3.0

When enterprise applications lack both explicit assignment requirements AND scoped provisioning controls, threat actors can exploit this dual weakness to gain unauthorized access to sensitive applications and data. The highest risk occurs when applications are configured with the default setting: “Assignment required” is set to “No” and provisioning isn’t required or scoped. This dangerous combination allows threat actors who compromise any user account within the tenant to immediately access applications with broad user bases, expanding their attack surface and potential for lateral movement within the organization.

While an application with open assignment but proper provisioning scoping (such as department-based filters or group membership requirements) maintains security controls through the provisioning layer, applications lacking both controls create unrestricted access pathways that threat actors can exploit. When applications provision accounts for all users without assignment restrictions, threat actors can abuse compromised accounts to conduct reconnaissance activities, enumerate sensitive data across multiple systems, or use the applications as staging points for further attacks against connected resources. This unrestricted access model is dangerous for applications that have elevated permissions or are connected to critical business systems. Threat actors can use any compromised user account to access sensitive information, modify data, or perform unauthorized actions that the application’s permissions allow. The absence of both assignment controls and provisioning scoping also prevents organizations from implementing proper access governance. Without proper governance, it’s difficult to track who has access to which applications, when access was granted, and whether access should be revoked based on role changes or employment status. Furthermore, applications with broad provisioning scopes can create cascading security risks where a single compromised account provides access to an entire ecosystem of connected applications and services.

The check runs as part of the whole assessment, with the ZeroTrustAssessment module installed:

Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUser
Connect-Maester
Invoke-Maester -Pack ZTA -SkipBuiltIn

Leave out -SkipBuiltIn to run Maester’s own checks in the same run.

About this check
SeverityMedium
Effort to fixMedium
Impact on usersMedium
PillarIdentity
CategoryApplication management
ProductEntra ID
FeatureApplications
AreaApplications and workload identities
ATT&CKT1078.004 Cloud Accounts
LicenceP1
TenantWorkforce, External

Product, feature, area and ATT&CK are Maester’s: the assessment does not record them, so Maester keeps them in the pack’s taxonomy.json.

A Microsoft check, part of the Zero Trust Assessment pack. Text from ZeroTrustAssessment 3.1.0, © Microsoft, MIT licence.